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Abstract 
Early-age enlistment increases a small country’s potential army size and thereby its 
attack-deterrence capacity. However, physical and psychological injuries and, 
ultimately, death generate a loss of quality-adjusted life-years that reduces the net 
benefit from early-age enlistment. The net benefit from early or later age recruitment 
is also affected by the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance and 
civilian productivity and by changes in his adjustment costs over the lifespan. The 
simulations of an optimization model incorporating these elements suggest that if the 
intensity of the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance is sufficiently 
larger than the intensity of the rise and decline of his civilian productivity, there exists 
an interior optimal enlistment age greater than the commonly practiced eighteen. In 
such a case, most of the simulation results are closely scattered around twenty-one 
despite large parameter changes. 
 
 
Keywords: Economics, enlistment-age, risk, cost and benefit, decision rule 
 
 
Author’s address: Amnon Levy, Economics, School of Economics and Information 
Systems, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia  
Author’s e-mail address: amnon_levy@uow.edu.au 
Author’s telephone: + 61 2 42213658 
Author’s Fax: + 61 2 42213725 
 1
 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the course of history countries engaged in external conflicts have 
maintained conscript armies with an early enlistment age—a legacy of a long agrarian 
past where life expectancy was short and boys were gradually conditioned to battle by 
looking after their clan’s livestock and crops and by hunting. Early-age enlistment 
increases a small country’s potential army size and thereby its deterrence capacity. 
However, the possibility of physical and psychological injuries and, ultimately, death 
and their associated loss of quality-adjusted life-years erode the expected benefits of 
early-age enlistment. The expected benefits from earlier or later age recruitment are 
also affected by the rise and decline of people’s military performance and civilian 
productivity and by the changes in the costs of adjustment from civilian environment 
to military environment and back to civilian environment during the lifespan. 
The most common enlistment age in the technologically advanced countries 
during the modern era has been eighteen. Males in these countries are likely to be 
swift and powerful at eighteen years of age, but their affluent upbringing has neither 
prepared them mentally to a close-range, interpersonal aggression nor to the 
destruction and killing capacity of long-range modern munitions. Drawing on 
interviews and first-person reports, Marshall (1978) has concluded that in World War 
II only fifteen to twenty percent of combat infantry soldiers fired their rifles at 
exposed enemy soldiers. According to Keegan and Holmes (1985), many of them 
fired harmlessly above their enemy heads. Grossman (1996, 2000) has argued that the 
exceptionally high firing rates in the Korean War (forty percent) and, in particular, the 
Vietnam War (ninety percent) were due to the introduction of Pavlovian and operant 
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conditioning of American combat soldiers, rather than to a widespread inclination to 
kill, and led to a high rate of post-traumatic stress disorder among veterans. This 
explanation might be supported by Holmes’ (1985) low assessment of the Argentine 
firing rates in the Falklands War.  
Drawing on these and other firing rates, on the high percentage of Vietnam 
War veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and on his own combat 
experience, Grossman (1996, 2000) has proposed that the majority of soldiers have 
innate resistance to killing. He has argued that in combat situations the primitive, 
midbrain portion takes control over soldiers’ actions and, due to species-survival 
instinct, prevents them in most cases from destroying fellow human beings. This 
killing-aversion proposition challenges the morality of an early enlistment-age, in 
particular, for the following reasons. The first is associated with the psychological 
scars borne by soldiers engaged in killing. The earlier in life they are enlisted and 
participate in killing, the longer they bear these scars and the larger their loss of 
quality-adjusted life years. The second reason is related to the level of representation 
in decision-making. When conscription takes place at early age, most of the pre-
service and service men do not have direct access to political power. Politically 
underrepresented, they have no strong direct influence on current recruitment laws 
that render them liable to participate in killing and, thereby, adversely affect their 
mental well being and hence quality of life from an early stage. This challenge can be 
strengthened by a positive association between proximity to graduating from school 
and intensity of the dissonance experienced by soldiers due to their current 
conditioning to kill and their earlier school education to indiscriminate, humanitarian 
sensitivity.  
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In addition to the potential participation in killing, recruitment at early age 
exposes young people to a high risk of being physically and psychologically injured 
and, ultimately, killed. In each of these events the duration and the quality of their 
lives and the lives of their relatives and friends are adversely affected. Though the 
lower the enlistment age the larger the potential loss of years of life, aspects such as 
the individual’s productivity and the number and ages of his dependents should be 
considered in assessing the overall loss of quality-adjusted life-years in the case of his 
death.1 Consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis (cf. Ando and Modigliani, 1963; 
Modigliani, 1966) productivity and number of dependents tend to rise and then 
decline over the lifespan. It is therefore possible that the greatest potential loss of 
quality-adjusted life-years for a conscript and his relatives, friends and the society is 
not associated with the earliest recruitment age. It is rather likely that the potential 
loss of quality-adjusted life-years first rises and then declines with the enlistment age 
along the feasible age range. The stronger the rise and decline of this potential loss 
and the higher the probability of war and the probability of being killed in war, the 
more socially desired it is to set the enlistment age closer to one of the boundaries of 
the feasible enlistment-age range. When the decline of the potential loss is weaker 
(stronger) than the rise, ceteris paribus, it is more socially desirable to set the 
enlistment age closer to the lower-bound (upper-bound). During the last hundred 
years the upper-bound of feasible enlistment-age has been increased by the rise in life 
expectancy, by the changes in warfare technology2 and by the transformation in the 
structure of households and in earning responsibilities. During the same period there 
                                               
1 The number of quality-adjusted life-years is used in a number of health economic studies as an index 
of lifetime well-being. See Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999) for a discussion of its suitability and Levy 
(2005) for an application. 
2 From the perspective of soldiers, warfare has become less physically challenging.  
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has been a large increase in the number of years of schooling and, thereby, a pressure 
on the lower-bound of the feasible enlistment-age to rise.  
In the absence of adequate, direct political representation, it took young people 
years of demonstrations and civil riots to end the draft in the United States by mid 
1973.3 Unlike the United States, small countries facing severe and close-to-home 
geopolitical risks cannot afford civil riots. Nor can they rely on an all-volunteer army. 
The earlier the enlistment age the larger their combined compulsory and reserve army 
and, thereby, its war-deterrence and defensive capacity. Responsibly, most of their 
young residents obey the existing recruitment rules. Nevertheless, a natural aversion 
to killing and a potential large loss of quality-adjusted life-years lend support to a 
revision of the enlistment age.  
The construction of a non ad-hoc enlistment-age rule for a small country 
maintaining a conscript defensive army is the objective of this paper. The optimal 
enlistment-age is analytically derived by considering the effects of enlistment age on 
army size and war-deterrence, military performance, foregone civilian output, 
remunerations in the case of physical and psychological injuries and in the case of 
death, and costs of adjustment. The analysis is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents the relationship between the army size, deterrence capacity, probability of 
war and the enlistment age. Section 3 details the expected national benefits and costs 
from enlisting at a given age. Section 4 derives the optimal enlistment-age and 
displays the numerical-simulation’s results for a wide range of parameter-values as 
well as the effects of the model parameters on this enlistment age. 
                                               
3 This process and its outcome have a generated a large literature on the economic issues and the 
quantity and quality of servicepersons associated with the choice of a draft versus an all-volunteer 
force. See Oi (1967) Altman and Fechter (1967), Fisher (1969) Altman and Barro (1971), Lee and 
McKenzie (1992), Ross (1994) and Warner and Asch (1996, 2001). 
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2. Enlistment age, army size and war deterrence and probability 
One of the main arguments in favor of an early enlistment age is that it allows 
a country facing geopolitical risks to enjoy a large reserve of trained soldiers. 
Consider a country in which military service is compulsory due to a geopolitical sate 
of hostility. The physically lower-bound on military service age is mint . The 
physically upper-bound on military service age coincides with the retirement age, 
maxt . During a peaceful period, the army is a force of conscripts and its size is equal 
to the size of the currently enlisted cohort. At wartime the reserves are called. The 
reserves comprise all ex-conscripts up to maxt  years of age. Hence, the country’s 
wartime-army is 
∫=
max
)()(
t
t
dntN ττ          (1) 
where ),( maxmin ttt ∈  denotes the drafting age and )(τn  the size of the cohort aged τ . 
Assuming, for tractability, that all cohorts have an identical size, n, then the wartime 
army size is  
ntttN )()( max −= .         (2) 
Suppose that the opponent is more populous, but possesses the same warfare 
technology. For simplicity, its wartime army, EN , is fixed, yet always ready to match 
the smaller country’s army:4 
ntttNN E )()(max minmax −== .       (3) 
                                               
4 A more elaborate, but greatly complicated, framework may consider reaction functions and a 
Stackelberg-type equilibrium. 
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In the absence of warfare technological advantage, size is crucial: the greater the ratio 
of the country’s wartime army to its rival’s wartime army the higher the country’s war 
deterrence. In formal terms, the probability of war breaking-out ( 10 << p ) is given 
by 
)]/)((1[)( max
ENtNptp µ−=        (4) 
where the scalar 10 << µ  is the army’s war-deterrent gradient, reflecting 
(with 1≠µ ) that the probability of war cannot be eliminated, and where 10 max << p  
is a scalar denoting the (highest) probability of war when the country is unarmed. 
Recalling equation (2), the probability of war is rendered as 
)(
)(
)1(
)}/()]()[(1{
)]/()(1[)(
min
minmax
max
max
minmaxminminmaxmax
minmaxmaxmax
tt
tt
p
p
ttttttp
ttttptp
−
−
+−=
−−−−−=
−−−=
µ
µ
µ
µ
    .(5) 
The earlier the enlisting age the greater the country’s war-deterrence and the lower the 
probability of war. As will become apparent in the following sections, expressing the 
probability of war as function of mintt −  facilitates the derivation of the optimal 
enlistment age within a framework that takes into account a person’s military 
contribution, foregone civilian production, adjustment costs and expected 
remunerations to him and his beneficiaries for a loss of quality-adjusted life-years due 
to injury, or death, and the effects of these factors on the expected net national benefit 
from enlisting that person at age t . 
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3. Expected net national benefit and its determinants 
The expected net national benefit (ENNB) from enlisting a person at 
),( maxmin ttt ∈  years of age is the difference between that person’s military 
contribution (M) and the sum of his foregone civilian output (C ), his costs of 
adjusting to military environment and readjusting to civilian environment when 
released (S), and his treatment costs and remuneration for loss of quality of life in the 
event of being physically and/or psychologically injured in war ( IR ), or the 
remuneration to his beneficiaries in the event of his death in war ( DR ). Taking the 
probabilities of being injured or killed in war to be θ  and φ  ( 1,0 << φθ  and 
1<+ φθ ), respectively, and the probability of war to be given by equation (5), the 
expected net national benefit from enlisting a person at t years of age is expressed as  
)]()()[()()()()( tRtRtptStCtMtENNB DI φθ +−−−=        (6) 
where M, C, S, IR  and DR  are measured in present-value nominal units.   
Consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, a person’s military contribution and 
civilian output are assumed to be twice differentiable and single-peaked in the interval 
),( maxmin tt , depicting an inverted U-shaped relationship between productivity and 
age.5 Similarly, the remuneration paid to beneficiaries for a conscript killed in war at 
age t is taken to be twice differentiable and single-peaked in the interval ),( maxmin tt  
so as to reflect a growing loss up to a critical age as the number of dependents and 
                                               
5 Age-earning profiles estimated from cross-sectional data are usually quadratic, hump-shaped for 
males (Irvine, 1981). In his seminal study on this issue, Miller (1965) has observed that the relative 
increases in income associated with economic growth are greater in the early years of working life than 
in the later years. He has argued that young workers tend to benefit more than older ones due to greater 
mobility, better training and employers’ preferences.    
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human capital rises and then a decline. The following second-order polynomials 
display such relationships: 
2
minminmin
)(~)()( ttttMtM t −−−+= αα       (7) 
2
minminmin
)(
~
)()( ttttCtC t −−−+= ββ       (8) 
2
minminmin )(
~)()( ttttRtR tDD −−−+= γγ       (9) 
where, 
mint
M , 
mint
C  and mint
DR  are the military contribution and civilian output of a  
mint  year old person and the remuneration to beneficiaries for the loss of such a 
person, respectively, and )~,(),
~
,(),~,( γγββαα  are pairs of positive scalars, expressed 
in present-value nominal units, reflecting the intensities of the rise and decline of the 
individual’s potential military performance and civilian productivity and of the rise 
and decline of the remuneration to beneficiaries for their forgone quality of life in the 
event of that person being killed, respectively. 
Let ),( maxmin
* tttm ∈  and ),( maxmin
* tttc ∈  be the prime ages as regards military 
contribution and civilian output, respectively, and ),( maxmin
* tttd ∈  the age of death 
associated with maximum remuneration to beneficiaries,6 then 
0)(~2)( min
** =−−=′ tttM mm αα                  (10) 
0)(
~
2)( min
** =−−=′ tttC cc ββ                  (11) 
                                               
6 *dt  may be determined by a combination of the number of life-years lost and the number and age 
composition of dependents. 
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0)(~2)(' min
** =−−= tttR dd
D γγ                  (12) 
and implying 
min
*
5.0~
ttm −
=
α
α                     (13) 
min
*
5.0~
ttc −
=
β
β                     (14) 
min
*
5.0~
ttd −
=
γ
γ .                    (15) 
Consequently, the military contribution of a t year-old person is given by 
2
min
min
*minmin
)(
5.0
)()( tt
tt
ttMtM
m
t −−
−−+=
α
α                           (16) 
his foregone civilian output by 
2
min
min
*minmin
)(
5.0
)()( tt
tt
ttCtC
c
t −−
−−+=
β
β                          (17) 
and the remuneration to his beneficiaries in the event of being killed at t is 
2
min
min
*minmin
)(
5.0
)()( tt
tt
ttRtR
d
t
DD −
−
−−+=
γ
γ .                         (18) 
The larger α , β  and γ  the greater the intensity of the rise and decline of the 
potential military performance, civilian productivity and death remuneration, 
respectively, over the period ),( maxmin tt . Furthermore, the shorter it takes to reach the 
highest level in each of these categories, the steeper the decline.   
 10
Injury in battle can be physical and/or psychological. Psychological injuries 
are inflicted by being violently assaulted, by losing comrades and by killing fellow 
human beings. Killing-aversion is manifested in post-traumatic stress disorder, loss of 
sense of self-innocence, loss of trust in human beings and institutions and loss of 
belief in the benevolence of human kind. (Cf., Grossman and Siddle, 1999) It is 
assumed that physical and psychological scars can prevail and adversely affect 
earning capacity and social interaction over the rest of the individual lifetime. Thus, 
the earlier the injury occurs in one’s life the greater can its cost. This assumption is 
formally represented by adding an annuity 0≥δ  (in present value), which is paid to 
the injured person and his beneficiaries over his potential remaining life expectancy 
had there been no injury ( tT − ), to the initial nominal cost IR̂  (in present value) of 
treating the injury. The sum of the treatment cost of, and the compensation to, a 
person injured at age t is given by  
)()()](ˆ[)(ˆ)( minminmin
min
min ttRtttTRtTRtR
I
t
I
tR
III −−=−−−+=−+= δδδδ 444 344 21 .  (19) 
The scalar δ  can be further interpreted as the level of the terminal incapacitation 
caused by the injury and measured in terms of foregone pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
opportunities per annum. When the initial treatment leads to complete recovery, 
0=δ . In any other case, 0>δ .   
 The costs of adjustment to military environment and readjustment to civilian 
environment for a person conscripted at t years of age are represented by 
)()( minmin ttStS t −+= λ         (20) 
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where 
mint
S  is the adjustment and readjustment costs at age mint  and λ  is the 
adjusting-readjusting cost coefficient. There are two opposing factors affecting the 
sign of λ : enthusiasm versus experience. While a greater level of eagerness to learn 
about organizations and systems and their operation might be associated with youth, a 
higher level of familiarity with organizations and systems is enjoyed in mature age. 
Hence, λ  is positive, zero, or negative, if the foregone enthusiasm is larger than, 
equal to, or smaller than, the experience gained as the age of enlistment rises. 
   By substituting equations (16) to (20) and equation (5) into equation (6), the 
expected net national benefit from recruiting a person to military service at age t is 
given by: 
[ ]
3
min
3
min
*
minmax
max
2
min
2
minmax
max
min
*
max
min
*
min
*
min
1
minmax
minminmax
max
0
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))((
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)()1(5.05.05.0
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                    .(21) 
4. Optimal enlistment-age and numerical simulations 
The optimal enlistment age is taken to be ),( maxmin ttt
o ∈  that maximizes ENNB . 
Recalling equation (21), the necessary and sufficient conditions for interior solution 
are: 
 12
0)()( 1min2
2
min3 =Α+−Α−−Α tttt
oo                 (22) 
)}/(5.0{}0)(2{ 32min2min3 ΑΑ+<⇒<Α−−Α tttt
oo                      (23) 
and the optimal enlistment-age is given by either 
3
13
2
22
min1 2
4
Α
ΑΑ−Α+Α
+= tt o                 (24) 
or 
3
13
2
22
min2 2
4
Α
ΑΑ−Α−Α
+= tt o                (25) 
satisfying the second-order condition (23).7 If neither ot1  nor 
ot2  satisfies condition 
(23), the optimal enlistment age is the earliest feasible age if 
)()( maxmin tENNBtENNB > , the latest feasible age if )()( maxmin tENNBtENNB < , or 
any of these bounds if )()( maxmin tENNBtENNB = . 
The numerical simulations of the optimal enlistment-age consider a likely 
benchmark scenario where 18min =t  years, 65max =t  years, 80=T  years, 
000,000,1$
min
=DtR , 000,500$min =
I
tR , 000,190$ˆ =
IR  and in recalling equation 
(19), 5000$)/()ˆ( minmin =−−= tTRR
II
tδ . In the absence of a clear assessment of the 
relationship between the costs of adjustment and age, the benchmark value of λ was 
set to be equal to zero. Interior solution could only be obtained with 
                                               
7 Where 1Α , 2Α , and 3Α  are the coefficient associated with )( mintt
o − , 2min )( tt
o −  and 
3
min )( tt
o −  in equation (21), respectively. 
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313
2
22min2 2/)4( ΑΑΑ−Α−Α+= tt
o  and as long as the parameter (α ) governing 
the intensity of the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance over the 
feasible period is at least 16.666 percent larger than the parameter ( β ) governing the 
intensity of the growth and decline of his civilian productivity over the same period. If 
βα 1666.1< , the optimal enlistment age coincides with the lower-bound and 
commonly used enlistment age—eighteen.  
Table 1 can be inserted here 
The benchmark simulation leading to an interior solution is presented in bold 
numbers by the central column of Table 1. The effects of the model parameters on the 
interior optimal enlistment age can be assessed by inspecting the columns on each 
side of the central one. The entries in these columns are computed by changing the 
value of one parameter at a time below and above its benchmark level while holding 
the rest of the parameters at their benchmark levels. These sensitivity analyses suggest 
that the optimal enlistment age first rises and then declines with the level of the 
highest probability of war ( maxp ), declines with the probability of being killed in war 
(φ ) and with the probability of being injured in war (θ ), rises and then declines with 
the army’s war-deterrence gradient ( µ ), rises with the prime-age of military 
performance, declines with the prime-age of people’s civilian production ( *ct ), 
strongly declines with the age of death associated with maximum remuneration to 
beneficiaries ( *dt ), rises with the parameter (α ) governing the intensity of the rise and 
decline of the individual’s military performance, declines with the parameter ( β ) 
governing the intensity of the growth and decline of the individual’s civilian 
productivity, rises with the parameter (γ ) governing the rise and decline of the death 
 14
remuneration, rises with the annual remuneration extended to injured soldiers (δ ), 
strongly declines with the correlation between costs of adjustment and age (λ ), rises 
with the minimum recruitment age ( mint ) and declines with the maximum recruitment 
age ( maxt ).  
5. Concluding remarks 
Early-age enlistment increases the potential army size and thereby the deterrence 
capacity of a small country facing geopolitical risks. However, the possibility of 
physical and psychological injuries and, ultimately, death and their associated loss of 
quality-adjusted life-years erode the expected net benefit from early-age enlistment. 
The expected net benefit from early, or late, age recruitment are also affected by 
growth and decline of military contribution and civilian output and changes in 
adjustment costs over the life cycle. The optimal enlistment-age was analytically 
derived by considering the effects of enlistment age on army size and deterrence of 
war, military performance, foregone civilian output, remunerations in the case of 
physical and psychological injuries or death, and costs of adjustment. The numerical 
simulations, performed with an ad hoc assessment of the likely parameters values, 
suggest that if the rise and decline of military performance is sufficiently steeper than 
the rise and decline of civilian productivity over the lifespan, there exists an interior 
optimal enlistment age that is greater than the commonly practiced eighteen. Despite 
large parameter changes, most of the simulation results in such a case are at the 
vicinity of twenty-one—an age that allows a completion of a first-degree college 
program in many disciplines, gaining work experience, participating in voting and 
politics and hence having direct influence on terms of service prior to enlistment. 
Furthermore, the simulations associated with the possible effect of age on adjustment 
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costs suggest that if the experience effect dominates the enthusiasm effect, a much 
more mature enlistment age is optimal. The optimality of a much more mature 
enlistment age is also suggested when the death-remuneration peaks at young age. 
However, the numerical simulations also suggest that if the rise and decline of 
military performance is not, or insufficiently, steeper than the rise and decline of 
civilian productivity over the lifespan, the optimal enlistment age is the lower-bound 
of the feasible recruitment age interval—the commonly practiced eighteen or even 
earlier. 
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Table 1: Numerical simulations’ results 
Parameter     
  & 
Enlisting 
age 
Much 
below the 
benchmark 
Below the 
benchmark 
The 
benchmark 
Above the 
benchmark 
Much 
above the 
benchmark 
maxp  
ot  (years) 
0.1 
18.209 
0.25 
19.087 
0.50 
21.014 
0.75 
21.906 
0.95 
20.418 
φ   
ot  (years) 
0.01 
22.351 
0.025 
21.860 
0.05 
21.014 
0.075 
20.131 
0.1 
19.206 
θ  
ot  (years) 
0.01 
21.553 
0.05 
21.319 
0.10 
21.0 
0.15 
20.621 
0.2 
20.350 
µ   
ot  (years) 
0.1 
18.240 
0.25 
19.195 
0.5 
21.0 
0.75 
21.057 
0.9 
19.079 
*
mt  (years) 
ot  (years) 
25 
18.847 
30 
19.743 
35 
21.0 
40 
22.784 
45 
25.062 
*
ct  (years) 
ot  (years) 
30 
32.301 
40 
21.672 
45 
21.0 
50 
20.676 
60 
20.334 
*
dt  (years) 
ot  (years) 
25 
45.13 
30 
27.733 
40 
21.0 
50 
19.448 
55 
19.089 
α  (dollars) 
ot  (years) 
3500 
18.248 
3750 
19.862 
4000 
21.014 
4500 
22.610 
5000 
23.696 
β  (dollars) 
ot  (years) 
2000 
24.331 
2500 
22.908 
3000 
21.0 
3250 
19.778 
3500 
18.222 
γ  (dollars) 
ot  (years) 
1000 
18.140 
2500 
18.826 
5000 
21.0 
7500 
24.206 
9000 
26.483 
δ  (dollars) 
ot  (years) 
1000 
20.404 
2500 
20.630 
5000 
21.0 
7500 
21.405 
9000 
21.643 
λ  (dollars) 
ot  (years) 
-5,000 
39.347 
-2,500 
31.544 
0 
21.0 
250 
19.651 
500 
18.187 
mint   
ot  (years) 
16 
18.776 
17 
19.894 
18 
21.014 
19 
22.135 
20 
23.257 
maxt   
ot  (years) 
55 
21.583 
60 
21.335 
65 
21.014 
67.5 
20.852 
70 
20.696 
 
 
 
